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Father Richard McCormick, S.J. 
is president of the Catholic Theo-
logical Society of America. 
In addition to his teaching duties 
at Bellarmine Seminary, he is a fre-
quent contributor to periodicals and 
theological journals . His annual 
"Notes on Moral Theology " in the 
Theological Studies attests to his 
ability to survey the mass and variety 
of available material and then to 
elucidate concisely and with great 
balance. 
Autonomy and Coercion: 
Moral Values in Medical Practice 
Richard A. McCormick, S.J. 
In his article, Fr. McCormick 
underscores the dangers of isolating 
a "right" from the environment in 
which it is exercised and from other, 
possibly superseding, "rights. " He 
then goes on to a discussion of the 
physician So right to autonomy in its 
full context. 
The prospect of some form of 
National Health Insurance Plan 
(NHIP) raises any number of issues 
with moral implications . One is the 
matter of coercion on the medical 
profession. Many physicians fear 
that a NHIP may be a form of eco-
nomic coercion forcing the physic-
ian to come under its aegises in a 
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way that violates his right to dispose 
freely of his services. He may also 
be unable to collect remuneration 
commensurate with his training. Co-
ercion, then, suggests a possible 
double loss of automony: in the 
disposal of services and in remun-
eration. 
This brief essay will not discuss 
whether a NHIP is necessary, nor 
whether it would involve some mea-
sure of coercion. Important as these 
questions are , they are far too broad 
and complicated to be discussed in 
a brief space. Rather, I will discuss 
professional and economic coercion 
on the physician within an hypo-
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thesis: if NHIP is called for, and if it 
brings some coercion, is loss of full 
autonomy of the physician sufficient 
reason in itself to say that a NHIP is 
unwarranted? Or, in other terms, 
where on the ladder of human and 
moral values does professional med-
ical autonomy rate? Professional 
a utonomy (as described) is certainly 
a value. The question is: how impor-
tant a value? Coercion is certainly 
a disvalue. The question is: how 
important a disvalue? 
Some medical opinion on the 
value of autonomy ranks it so high 
that it calls it a right. Thus Dr. Paul 
W. Leithart referred to a doctor's 
"right to choose whom he would 
serve. " (Linacre Quarterly, May, 
1970) The reasons behind this high 
evaluation are familiar. Loss of full 
autonomy tends to introduce a third 
party into the doctor-patient rela-
tionship with all the dangers associ-
ated with such an intrusion. Second-
ly, there is the time-consuming 
mUltiplication of paper work. Third-
ly, autonomy promotes specializa-
tion with the consequent advance of 
medicine (because specialists can 
charge commensurately for their 
services). Fourthly, government in-
volvement could lead to growing 
apathy on the part of health pro-
viders , and to eventual carelessness 
and routine in medical practice. And 
so on. Considerations such as these 
have led many physicians to regard 
their full economic and professional 
autonomy as a strict right. And if it 
is a right, then obviously any system 
which infringes on it is no longer a 
legitimate option. 
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But should we speak of the phy-
sician's ability to dispose freely of 
his services as a right? Especially, 
should we view this as an absolute 
right? Here a caution seems to be in 
order.Any conversation about rights 
takes place in a definite culture, a 
culture with particular qualities and 
characteristic perspectives, and 
these perspectives influence the di-
rection of the conversation. Ameri-
can culture is stamped with the 
following characteristics: the market 
economy; a strong tradition of pri-
vate enterprise ; a strong tradition of 
individual freedom (especially in 
the face of governmental bureau-
cracy and collectivistic tendencies) ; 
a near idolatry of affluence as the 
symbol of success ; a highly sophisti-
cated technology which leads 
Americans to canonize and reward 
special technical expertise. These 
factors combine to constitute a cli-
mate or value-structure within which 
we delineate rights and interpret 
their meaning. It can be persuasive-
ly argued, I believe, that this climate 
favors an individualistic reading of 
rights- both as to their existence 
and their meaning. By "individual-
istic" I mean a reading which views 
the right apart from the value which 
generates it and which it serves. 
A Right As Moral Claim 
In the present context, it can be 
said that a right is a moral claim one 
has on others in view of a certain 
goal. It is this goal or value which 
generates the right and controls its 
interpretation and application. For 
instance, in an industrial society, the 
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need for just wages and decent 
working conditions generate the 
right of workers to organize in pur-
suit of these values. At the point 
where organization would no longer 
serve these ends, it would be sense-
less to speak of the "right to organ-
ize." Similarly, since good medical 
practice often demands disclosure 
of confidential information , the 
doctor-patient relationship is sur-
rounded by the protections of pro-
fessional secrecy. The patient has 
the right to have certain of his 
self-disclosures remain confidential. 
But this right exists precisely be-
cause sound medical care demands 
it. It is this good or value which 
generates the right. If confidentiality 
(almost per impossibile) were no 
longer necessary for good medical 
care, it would be senseless to speak 
of it as a right. 
Now what are we to say of the 
"right of a physician to dispose freely 
of his services" and his "right to 
determine his fee?" If we are to 
speak of these as rights-and if 
properly nuanced, it seems that we 
should-it is precisely because they 
are demanded by good medical care, 
its availability and quality. To say 
anything else would be to ascribe 
a right to a service-oriented pro-
fession which had nothing to do with 
the services rendered. 
As soon, however, as one speaks 
of "good medical care, its avail-
ability and quality," one encounters 
a serious problem. For a judgment 
about the adequacy of medical care 
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depends heavily on whether one 
views such care as a right or a 
privilege. If it is a privilege, then 
the fact that millions are without 
it might not affect one's judgment of 
the adequacy of a given health care 
system. If it is a right , a quite dif-
ferent assessment might be made. 
Professor Louis F. Buckley (Linacre 
Quarterly, May, 1970) has argued 
very persuasively that there is a 
right to health care. I believe that 
this conclusion, when it is properly 
understood, is absolutely correct. 
However, since its entry into con-
temporary consciousness is quite 
recent, it is a conclusion not likely 
to be endorsed by all physicians and 
therefore one likely to split the med-
ical profession right down the mid-
dle. Nonetheless , one's position on 
the right to health care is deter-
minative of his position on the scope 
of physicians' rights. 
The 'Delivery System' and 
the Right to Health 
If all individuals have a right to 
health care, (as an outgrowth of 
their right to life and health), then 
obviously the duty to provide this 
care falls heavily on those who have 
the competence: physicians and 
para-medical personnel. This does 
not mean-as Dr. Leithart argued-
that any individual has a claim on a 
specific doctor's services. It does 
mean that the profession as a whole , 
since it is service-oriented in support 
ofafundamentalright, must organize 
its delivery system in such a way that 
it brings the exercise of this right 
within the reach of as many as is 
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humanly possible. The prerogatives 
of the medical profession (its rights) 
cannot be viewed as privileges 
grounded in the convenience of the 
physician ; they are rooted in the good 
of the patient(s). If an open, fee-for-
service delivery system without any 
governmental partnership does not 
provide for this good adequately, and 
if a health care system involving fed-
eral partnership would do so, then 
it is not clear that the moral rights of 
the physician are infringed, even if 
his autonomy is somewhat reduced. 
These brief reflections are both 
abstract and very possibly mislead-
ing. By saying that they are abstract 
I mean that they provide only the 
most general framework within 
which to think about autonomy and 
the physician's rights. This frame-
work yields the conclusion that full 
autonomy, even though a very im-
portant value, is a subordinate one. 
It is subordinate to the delivery of 
adequate health care to those who 
have a right to expect such care. 
This conclusion is not very sensa-
tional , but at least it frees us from 
the rhetorical absolutisms so often 
encountered in discussions of nat-
ional health insurance plans. These 
discussions often overlook the fact 
that physicians have already sacri-
ficed some autonomy in the many 
insurance plans now available, and 
in the growing phenomenon of group 
practice. The reflections presented 
here are abstract also in the sense 
that it is not factually clear how 
much autonomy would be sacrificed 
in a NHIP. 
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More importantly, these general 
reflections could very easily be mis-
leading. They tend to suggest two 
desperate and competing alterna-
tives as the only live options in facing 
the health care problem of the na-
tion : an open , fee-for-service, volun-
tary delivery system vs. a federal 
delivery system. Actually, since 
government partnership and volun-
tary, private provision of health care 
both represent genuine values in 
contemporary American society, 
we should strive to maintain the 
advantages of both, in thought as 
well as in action. Sister Mary 
Maurita , RSM , executive director 
of the Catholic Hospital Association , 
put this very well in her testimony 
before the House Ways and Means 
Committee: "Systems and programs 
which restrict a person's right to 
choice, and which stifle the initiative 
of providers of health services to 
seek out and help these people , will , 
in the long run, lead to total reliance 
on a federal system which could be 
inflexible, unimaginative and insen-
sitive to needs , and these could 
hinder the common good. Great 
care must be taken to strike the 
proper balance between those mat-
ters in which government has a role 
and those which are developed pri-
vately." 
Relationship and Balance 
On the basis of this complemen-
tary relationship and balance, Sister 
Maurita concluded : "We urge the 
continuing viability of our voluntary 
or private sector of health providers 
in a balanced partnership with gov-
ernment as we restructure a com-
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prehensive health delivery system 
for the future. This viability and 
balance requires involvement of the 
private sector with government in 
setting standards for quality services, 
as well as reasonable controls and 
regulations." (Hospita l Progress, 
Dec. 1971) 
This is the approach to bring to 
a discussion of government partner-
ship in health care. Any other 
attitude, besides being unrealistic, 
would either underestimate or over-
estimate the physician's autonomy. 
By underestimating autonomy we 
could get trapped in a stifling col-
lectivism which would eventually 
undermine the provision of sound 
health care. But by overestimating 
it, the medical profession could be 
its own worst enemy by failing to' 
face the nation's health problems in 
a creative, service-minded way. Such 
failure would all but constitute a 
mandate to the government to inter-
vene in bungling and inefficient 
ways, since the intervention would 
not enjoy the cooperation and con-
sultation of the medical profession . 
If a NHIP is to support the rights 
of all- physician as well as patient -
the medical profession must be a 
partner in the planning. And if it is 
wise , it will bring to this planning an 
attitude toward its rights which inter-
prets them within a service-minded 
structure. This means that while 
the autonomy in question is a genu-
ine value, it may not be approached 





Father McCormick here raises 
a new and important distinction, 
viz, the distinction between the 
autonomy of the individual physi-
cian and the autonomy of the pro-
fession as a whole in relation to the 
provision of health care service 
especially of those who through no 
fault of their own are incapable of 
providing this service for themselves. 
Given an established fact that 
there exist two distinctive rights 
(the individual physician's right to 
dispose autonomously of his service 
and the patients right to health care) 
then it further seems to me that 
Father McCormick has demonstrat-
ed again great balance by grasping 
the apparent dilemma by both horns 
and going through the middle. Both 
values (rights) are to be preserved 
wherein possible but where this is 
not possible then the right to hie 
(health care) of the patient is a more 
fundamental and urgent right than 
the right of the profession as a whole 
to its autonomy. Therefore, the pro-
fession as a whole should and must 
surrender through its members a 
part of its autonomy in order to 
guarantee the more fundamental 
right of the patient. It is granted that 
the profession can surrender auto-
nomy only through the person of 
the individual physician. It must 
therefore be held as equally funda -
mental that never is it allowed that 
this personal loss of autonomy can 
become total or absolute or in any 
way dehumanizing for the individual 
physician. 
I trust that Father McCormick's 
thought will stimulate a lively com-
mentary from our readers. (VHP) 
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